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September 13, 2021

Camp David Agreement Definition

Filed under: Uncategorized — Mark Baker @ 9:42 am

The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) is the institution created by the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to monitor the implementation of the security provisions of the agreement and prevent violations. It was designed by the Israelis and Egyptians for their particular security situation and is limited in their measure to the Sinai Peninsula. The success of the MFO structure is based on several mutually reinforcing pillars, both structurally and substantively. Your mandate is specific and unambiguous. Both sides feel empowered and invest in the longevity and stability of the peace they have negotiated. The continued leadership and support of the United States has been a decisive pivot. All this is supported by an efficient control structure and optimized decision and communication channels. The end result is a mechanism considered by both parties to be reliable and professional, in which both see the value of maintenance. Discussions focused on a number of issues, including the future of Israeli settlements and airbases in the Sinai Peninsula, but it was Gaza and the West Bank that continued to be the main challenges. In particular, delegations were divided on the applicability of UN Security Council Resolution 242 to a long-term agreement in the territories as well as on the status of Israeli settlements in the planned negotiations on Palestinian autonomy that would follow a peace treaty. In the end, although the summit did not produce a formal peace agreement, it succeeded in laying the groundwork for an Israeli-Egyptian peace in the form of two “framework documents” that set out the principles of a bilateral peace agreement and a formula for Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank.

Carter`s advisers insisted on the creation of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement that would result in a final settlement of the Palestinian question. They believed in a short, loose and independent bond between the two countries, strengthened by the creation of a coherent basis for a settlement. But Carter did not feel “high enough” and was interested in setting up a written “Land for Peace” agreement with Israel, which restores the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank. [13] Many times, both Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to abolish the negotiations for the sole sake of being re-enchanted in the trial by Carter`s personal appeals. Two other important lessons are less tangible. Camp David needed remarkable leadership from Sadat, Bégin, and Carter. Sadat took enormous political risks – which ultimately cost him his life – in negotiating with Israel. Bégin was not a peacenik, but he imposed his skepticism and ideology to reach an agreement. And despite a number of challenges and early failures, Carter found a way to play the role of a credible broker and intermediary. Camp David is a dramatic story of diplomacy and leadership. The move arose from a zeal to seek help from NATO countries to improve Egypt`s struggling economy, a belief that Egypt should start focusing more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbors and help resolve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Bégin`s reaction to Sadaat`s initiative, although what Sadat or Carter did not expect, showed the willingness to engage the Egyptian leader.

Like Sadat, Bégin saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country`s best interest. It would allow Israel to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation, which could try to use its size to make undesirable or unacceptable demands. . . .

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